

Impact of Good Corporate Governance on Company Profitability and Sustainability

**Research Paper** 



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# **Outline**

- Study Objective
- Impact of Good Governance
- Corporate Governance and Performance in Literature
- Research Hypothesis
- Methodology
- Results
- Robustness Checks
- Limitations and Future Research
- Conclusion

# Impact of Good Corporate Governance on Company Profitability and Sustainability

## **Study Objective**

 This study looks to investigate the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in 92 listed companies in Saudi Arabia.

 Present empirical evidence to promote the adoption of good corporate governance practices.

#### **Impact of Good Governance**

Maintaining high cash flow expectations (La Porta, Lopez-de-Manes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002)



Lowering the cost of capital (Hail & Leuz, 2006; Wu, Lin, & Yang, 2016)

#### **Corporate Governance and Performance in Literature**

- A large body of research examined the relationship between corporate governance and corporate performance in developed and emerging economies.
- Many have reported improved corporate governance practices are positively associated with firm performance (Chen, 2001; Grompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003; Black, Kim, & Jang, 2006).
- The variation from country to country can be explained by different economic and regulatory environment found in different nations across the world (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2007).

#### **Corporate Governance and Performance in Literature**

- A small number of literature addresses the relationship between governance and performance in the context of Saudi Arabia.
- Fallatah and Dickens (2009) find that corporate governance and firm value have a positive relationship, but corporate governance was not a statistically significant predictor for return on assets.
- Al-Sahafi, Rodrigs, and Barnes (2015) reveal that board size is positively related to return on assets, return on equity, and firm value in the Saudi banking sector.

#### **Research Hypothesis**

#### Hypothesis:

Good corporate governance practices are positively associated with better firm performance.

Sector	Number of firms
Consumer Staples	8
Consumers Discretionary	9
Materials	25
Financials	19
Healthcare	6
Energy	3
Real Estate	9
Industrials	8
Telecommunication Services	3
Utilities	2
Total	92

#### Methodology

- ROE and Tobin's Q are used extensively in corporate governance empirical literature (Pintea & Fulop, 2015).
- A common practice is to control for asset size and years since listing (Chen, 2001; Black, Kim, & Jang, 2006).
- Leverage can impact profitability, so a control variable is introduced (Chen, 2001; Black, Kim, & Jang, 2006; Fallatah and Dickens, 2009).
- To account for industry characteristics, dummy variables are often used (Black, Kim, & Jang, 2006; Fallatah and Dickens, 2009).

# Methodology

Variables	Exp. Sign	Description
Dependent variables		
Return on equity		Net income / Shareholder's equity
Tobin's Q		(Market capitalization + BV of debt) / BV of total assets
Independent variable		
Corporate Governance Index	+	Includes BoD, SHR, T&PD, and SHR scores for the year 2015
Control variables		
Firm size	-	Natural log of total assets
Firm age	-	Years since listing
Leverage	-	Debt to total assets ratio
Sector		Belonging to one of 11 GICS sectors (dummy variable)

 $Performance = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CG + \beta_2 \ln(assets) + \beta_3 age + \beta_4 leverage + \beta_5 sector + \varepsilon$ 

## Methodology

Variables	Exp. Sign	Description	
Dependent variables			
Return on equity		Net income / Shareholder's equity	
Tobin's Q		(Market capitalization + BV of debt) / total assets	
Independent variable			
Board of directors	+		
Shareholders' rights	+		
Transparency and public disclosure	+		
Stakeholders' rights	+		
Control variables			
Firm size	-	Natural log of total assets	
Firm age	-	Years since listing	
Leverage	-	Debt to total assets ratio	
Sector		Belonging to one of Tadawul's GICS sectors (dummy variable)	

 $Performance = \beta_0 + \beta_1 BoD + \beta_2 SHR + \beta_3 PD + \beta_4 STR + \beta_5 \ln(assets) + \beta_6 age + \beta_7 leverage + \beta_8 sector + \varepsilon$ 

# **Results: Composite Index**

	Mode	1.9)	
Independent variables	Unstandardized coefficient	Standardized coefficient	Significance
Corporate Governance Index	.006	.351	.000***
Leverage	165	282	.004***
Telecommunication services (sector)	175	216	.025**
	Model 2: Tobin's Q $(R^2 = 22.2)$		
Independent variables	Unstandardized coefficient	Standardized coefficient	Significance
Corporate Governance Index	.039	.313	.003***
Firm size	273	502	.000***

<sup>\*, \*\*, \*\*\*</sup> indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels

#### **Results: Subindices**

\*, \*\*, \*\*\* indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1%, levels

	<b>Model 1: Return on Equity</b> $(R^2 = 22.2)$			
Independent variables	Unstandardized coefficient	Standardized coefficient	Significance	
Transparency and public disclosure	.003	.264	.007***	
Leverage	186	317	.002***	
Telecommunication services (sector)	172	212	.028**	
Real estate (sector)	098	202	.045**	
	Model 2: Tobin's Q $(R^2 = 20.8)$			
Independent variables	Unstandardized coefficient	Standardized coefficient	Significance	
Transparency and public disclosure	.022	.277	.007***	
Firm size	256	470	.000***	

#### **Robustness Checks**

 Using alternate construction of CG score and different performance indicators (Black, Kim, & Jang, 2006) to check robustness.

- An equally weighted index had a minimal effect on coefficients of the significant variables.
- CG score is statistically significant (p-value = 0.012) when using market-to-book ratio as an additional measure of firm performance.

#### **Limitations and Future Research**

 Regression models may suffer from omitted variables bias and endogeneity.

 Another limitation is that the relatively small sample size, which covers a single year, 2015.

 Future research to focus on increasing sample size to cover more companies and multiple years to allow for more accurate estimates.

#### **Conclusion**

 A positive relationship exists between corporate governance and firm performance, proxied by return on equity and Tobin's Q.

• Out of the four subindices, transparency and public disclosure is found to be statistically significant.

 Future studies are recommended refine the model by introducing other control variables, addressing limitations such as endogeneity, and increasing sample size. شكراً لكم Thank You